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Abstract 
High concentration of creditors can have two beneficial effects on borrowers: i) by 
enhancing lenders’ ability to monitor, it can reduce the likelihood of financial distress; ii) by 
reducing coordination failure among creditors, it can help a distressed firm to avoid 
bankruptcy. However, a strong probability of debt renegotiation can exert a feedback effect 
on the likelihood of financial distress, by generating perverse ex-ante incentives for 
borrowers (soft budget constraint). Moreover, high concentration of creditors can expose 
borrowers to greater liquidity risks. Using Italian data on manufacturing firms, we try to 
separate empirically these conflicting effects. Our results show that, if we control for the 
soft-budget-constraint and liquidity effects, high concentration of bank credit reduces the 
likelihood of financial distress and liquidation, as predicted by the literature on relationship 
banking. But these benefits do not come without costs: i) enhanced monitoring is offset by 
the soft-budget-constraint effect and ii) higher concentration of credit lines increases 
liquidity risks and thus makes both financial distress and liquidation more likely. Ultimately, 
the overall effect of more concentrated banking relations is a lower probability of liquidation 
but a higher probability of financial distress. This helps to explain the widespread existence 
of multiple but asymmetric banking relations in Italy. 
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In this paper we empirically investigate the impact of creditor concentration on the 
probability that borrowers will incur financial distress and on the likelihood of liquidation in 
the event of distress.
2 
A  large  body  of  theoretical  literature  has  analyzed  the  impact  of  closer  and  more 
concentrated  credit  relationships  on  borrowers’  performance.  The  literature  on  financial 
intermediation as developed by Diamond (1984) and others (see Gorton and Winton, 2003, 
for  a  review)  posits  that  higher  concentration  of  creditors  facilitates  monitoring  and 
screening, leading to a lower ex post probability of default. This higher concentration is 
normally deemed to facilitate the renegotiation of debt (due to lower coordination costs) 
when the borrower is in financial distress (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
Although the literature often emphasizes the benefits of close banking relationships, it 
also  highlights  at  least  two  possible  drawbacks  (Boot,  2000):  the  soft budget constraint 
problem and the liquidity risk. Realizing that they can easily renegotiate their debt contracts 
ex post, borrowers may have perverse incentives ex ante, leading to opportunistic behaviour 
or  excessive  risk taking  (Bolton  and  Scharfstein,  1996;  Dewatripont  and  Maskin,  1995). 
This can increase the ex ante probability of financial distress. On the other hand, single 
lending relationships can expose the borrower’s investment project to the risk of termination 
due to liquidity problems that the lender is experiencing and that cannot be distinguished 
from an individual borrower’s credit problem (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
These  conflicting  forces  can  prompt  firms  to  establish  multiple  but  asymmetric 
banking relations (Elsas et al., 2004; Bannier, 2005), where the presence of a “main” bank 
                                                           
1  We would like to thank Giorgio Albareto, Paolo Angelini, Luigi Cannari, Guido de Blasio, Francesca 
Lotti, Andrea Neri, Paola Rossi, two anonymous referees and participants in the “Finance Lunch Seminar” at 
Harvard University (April 2007) for valuable comments and suggestions. We alone are responsible for any 
mistakes. The views we express in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. Email: 
amanda.carmignani@bancaditalia.it, massimo.omiccioli@bancaditalia.it. 
2  By financial distress we mean a situation where the firm fails to meet one or more conditions of the 
financial agreement associated with its borrowing activities (Weston, 1994). In this paper we use “distress” and 
“financial distress” interchangeably.   4 
would allow the borrower to retain some of the benefits of relationship lending, while the 
presence of less informed “arm’s length” banks can be viewed as insurance against liquidity 
risks. 
While a growing number of empirical studies have investigated the role of creditor 
concentration as a determinant of success in formal reorganization procedures or out of 
court workouts,
3 the impact of closer lending relationships, through enhanced monitoring 
ability, on borrowers’ ex post probability of financial distress has not received attention. A 
voluminous  empirical  literature  analyzes  the  impact  of  close  bank  relationships  on  the 
availability of credit, loan contract terms and cash flow constraints and investment, while 
earlier papers studied the announcement effect of bank loan agreements on the stock prices 
of borrowing firms.
4 Most of the results are consistent with the idea that less dispersed 
creditors are in a better position to screen and monitor borrowers, but they fall short of 
offering direct evidence on the matter. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have 
tried to test the impact of multiple banking relationships on the probability of default (Foglia 
et al., 1998; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004).
5 
Our analysis improves on the existing empirical literature in three respects. First, in 
line  with  the  theoretical  literature,  we  distinguish  two  different  effects  of  creditor 
concentration: 1) the effect on the probability of incurring financial distress, as concentration 
increases  lenders’  monitoring  ability;  2)  the  effect  on  the  probability  of  a  financially 
distressed firm being forced into liquidation, as concentration reduces coordination failure 
among creditors. Separating these different effects is crucial. On the basis of the evidence 
that firms with closer lending relationships have a lower probability of liquidation, we are 
                                                           
3  While earlier papers were almost exclusively based on the U.S. experience (Gilson, 1989; 1990; Gilson 
et al., 1990; Betker et al., 1993; Asquith et al., 1994; Franks and Touros, 1994; James, 1995; 1996; Gilson 
1997), more recent studies also offer evidence for some European countries (Elsas and Krahnen, 2002; Brunner 
and Krahnen, 2004; Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
4  See Gorton and Winton (2003), Boot (2000), Ongena and Smith (2000a), and Berger and Udell (1998) 
for an extensive survey of this literature. 
5  Due to the lack of information on firms’ characteristics, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) fail to control for 
borrowers’ ex ante observed probability of default. Thus, the result they obtain (a higher probability of default 
for firms with fewer banking relations) may suffer from serious selection bias if observably riskier firms choose 
or  are  forced to  rely  on  fewer  banking  relations.  Foglia  et  al.  (1998),  on  the  other  hand, while  carefully 
controlling for borrowers’ risk by many balance sheet indicators, do not make a clear distinction between the 
effects of multiple lending on financial distress and liquidation.   5 
unable to assert whether this happens because of the more intensive and effective monitoring 
by lenders (which lowers the probability of financial distress) or because more concentrated 
lenders are less likely to trigger liquidation when borrowers are in financial distress. While 
better monitoring can in general be considered as welfare improving,
6 avoiding liquidation is 
an efficient outcome only when the net present value of the firm as a going concern is higher 
than its liquidation value.
7 
Second, in order to identify the monitoring effect of closer bank relationships, it is 
necessary to control for the feedback effect arising from a more lenient renegotiation in the 
event of financial distress. While the soft budget constraint problem is well known in the 
theoretical  literature,  we  are  not  aware  of  any  empirical  study  that  seeks  to  take  this 
phenomenon into account. This is the second original contribution of our paper. We estimate 
the probability of liquidation, conditional on financial distress, and we include its predicted 
value in the regression for the probability of (future) financial distress. This allows us to 
disentangle the effect of creditor concentration due to lenders’ monitoring ability from the 
soft budget constraint effect. 
Finally, in order to capture the liquidity effect of more concentrated banking relations, 
we measure concentration in two different ways: i) on bank credit granted to the borrower, 
where a low concentration is expected to reduce firm’s exposure to liquidity risks, as the 
firm can more easily switch to another bank to handle a request for repayment by any one 
lender or any other liquidity shock;
8 ii) on bank credit actually used by the borrower, where 
high concentration is expected to increase both the monitoring ability of “main” banks and 
the likelihood of debt renegotiation under financial distress. 
                                                           
6  For a discussion of the potential for overmonitoring, see  Pagano and Roell (1998), Burkart et al. (1997) 
and Tirole (2006, pp. 359 361). 
7  The liquidation of inefficient or, even worse, opportunistic or fraudulent firms is essential for the proper 
functioning of a market economy. It prevents inefficient firms from getting further financing to the detriment of 
lenders,  competitors  and  potentially  alternative  investment  projects.  For  an  analysis  of  the  negative 
macroeconomic  consequences  of  Japanese  banks’  widespread  practice  of  continuing  to  lend  to  otherwise 
insolvent firms, see Peek and Rosengren (2005), Hoshi (2006), Caballero et al. (2006). 
8   From  this  perspective,  fringe  banks  play  the  same  role  as  loan  commitments  (Houston  and 
Venkataraman, 1996; Shockley and Thakor, 1997), although in the specific Italian context credit lines are 
usually revocable and banks do not apply fees on the amount of credit granted. The cost of this kind of 
insurance against liquidity risk usually consists in a partial use of such credit lines, whose interest rates are 
higher than those applied by main banks (D’Auria et al., 1999).   6 
We use a detailed and unique data set on Italian manufacturing firms and their lenders. 
Firms are observed in the period 1997 2003 (around 42,600 observations as a whole). We 
match individual information on bank loans, firms’ state of activity and balance sheet data. 
Creditor concentration effects are investigated by directly examining the concentration of 
bank  financing  and  controlling  for  many  characteristics  of  firms,  banks  and  bank firm 
relations. 
We  report  four  main  results.  First,  higher  concentration  of  disbursed  bank  credit 
reduces the probability of a financially distressed firm being forced into liquidation. Second, 
if we control for the soft budget constraint effect, higher concentration of disbursed bank 
credit, fostering lenders’ monitoring ability, also reduces the probability that the borrower 
enters financial distress. This evidence lends new and more direct support to the predictions 
of the literature on relationship banking. However, the benefits of relationship banking do 
not come without costs. Our third (and most novel) result is that the soft budget constraint 
effect offsets the lower probability of financial distress due to banks’ greater monitoring 
ability. Finally, we find that higher concentration of credit lines, by increasing liquidity risks 
for  borrowers,  enhances  the  likelihood  of  both  financial  distress  and  liquidation.  As  for 
financial distress, moreover, the liquidity effect is quantitatively stronger than the monitoring 
effect. In the end, we find that the overall effect of more concentrated banking relations is a 
lower probability of liquidation for firms under financial distress, accompanied by a higher 
probability of incurring financial distress. These results can help to explain why multiple but 
asymmetric banking relations are so common in Italy and many other European countries 
(Ongena and Smith, 2000b). They also point to a suggestion for future empirical research. 
Since the efficiency of banks’ decisions whether or not to liquidate financially distressed 
firms appears to be crucial in assessing the overall benefits of more concentrated banking 
relationships,  more  efforts  should  be  devoted  to  studying  this  issue  (Chemmanur  and 
Fulghieri, 1994).
 9 
Since our study has access to an extremely rich dataset, we also document and discuss 
the  impact  of  other  variables.  Consistently  with  the  predictions  (Diamond,  1991;  2004), 
                                                           
9   The efficiency of the bankruptcy system  in encouraging the reorganization of viable firms and the 
liquidation of unviable ones is one of the key elements shaping creditors’ incentives (Franks and Loranth, 
   7 
short term debt increases the probabilities of liquidation and financial distress. The results 
are mixed and less clear cut for the effect of collateral: a higher share of collateralized debt 
tends  to  increase  the  probability  of  liquidation  for  financially distressed  firms,  since  it 
probably makes it more difficult to reconcile the conflicting claims of debt holders (Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996), while the negative effect on the probability of financial distress is 
weaker and only marginally significant. The most interesting result is that, contrary to the 
prevailing view, the presence of debt held by dispersed creditors (such as trade creditors and 
bondholders)  is  negatively  correlated  with  both  financial  distress  and  liquidation. 
Concerning  financial  distress,  our  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypotheses  that  trade 
creditors  have  an  informational  advantage  in  screening  and  monitoring  their  customers 
(Mian  and  Smith,  1992;  Petersen  and  Rajan,  1997)  and  that  the  rules  and  institutions 
designed  for  publicly traded  companies  work  like  a  centralized  monitoring  mechanism 
(Khalil et al., 2007). As for liquidation, our evidence lends support to the hypotheses that 
highly dispersed creditors are unable to be proactive in the event of borrowers’ financial 
distress (Bris and Welch, 2005) and that bank lenders are tougher than other creditors in their 
bargaining with distressed firms (Park, 2000; Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates in more detail the 
hypotheses we want to test, the data we use and our empirical strategy. Section 3 describes 
and discusses the econometric results for our baseline specification. Section 4 presents a 
large set of robustness checks and extensions. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Hypotheses, methodology and data description 
2.1  Specification of the hypotheses 
We  focus  on  the  effects  that  the  concentration  of bank  relationships exerts  on the 
probability that the borrower will incur financial distress and on the likelihood of liquidation 
in this event. Table 1 summarizes our main hypotheses. 
Concerning  the  probability  of  financial  distress,  the  literature  on  financial 
intermediation highlights the role of banks as information producers. From this point of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
2005; Giné and Love, 2006; Hart, 2000; White, 1989).   8 
view, the presence of multiple bank lenders can reduce the amount of monitoring for two 
different reasons: i) by increasing the incentives to engage in free riding (Diamond, 1984) 
and ii) by reducing the amount of information that each bank can extract from its relations 
with the borrower (Nakamura, 1993; Mester et al., 2007). In both cases, when the task of 
monitoring is delegated to a single agent, information asymmetries are reduced and a lower 
ex post probability of default should follow.  
Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)  show  that  a  larger  number  of  creditors  complicates 
renegotiation  (as  coordination  costs  are  higher)  and  fosters  liquidation.  If  ex  post 
renegotiation of a loan agreement is too easy, a borrower may exert insufficient effort in 
preventing a bad outcome (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
The loss of efficiency ex post (inefficient liquidation) may turn out to be beneficial ex ante, 
as it represents a device disciplining managers against opportunistic behaviour. Detragiache 
et al. (2000) show that multiple banking can reduce the firm’s exposure to liquidity risks. It 
will lower both the probability of the firm incurring financial distress due to an unexpected 
contraction of credit and the probability of liquidation in the event of distress, as the firm 
may easily increase its credit or substitute lenders who are willing to withdraw. 
Table 1 
EFFECTS OF BANK DEBT CONCENTRATION 
 
VARIABLES  PROBABILITY OF LIQUIDATION     
UNDER FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
PROBABILITY OF  
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
     
CONCENTRATION  
OF BANK CREDIT USED 
REDUCTION 
(COORDINATION FAILURE ↓) 
BOLTON AND SCHARFSTEIN (1996) 
REDUCTION 
 (MONITORING ↑) 
DIAMOND (1984); NAKAMURA (1993) 
CONCENTRATION  
OF BANK CREDIT GRANTED 
INCREASE 
(LIQUIDITY RISK ↑) 
DETRAGIACHE ET AL. (2000) 
INCREASE 
(LIQUIDITY RISK ↑) 
DETRAGIACHE ET AL. (2000) 
PROBABILITY OF LIQUIDATION  
UNDER FINANCIAL DISTRESS  − 
REDUCTION 
(COORDINATION FAILURE ↓) 
BOLTON AND SCHARFSTEIN (1996) 
   9 
The literature shows that other features of debt contracts may be used to deter firms 
from default and enhance lenders’ monitoring.
10 In order to correctly identify the effects of 
debt concentration, it is crucial to control for other factors influencing the probabilities of 
financial distress and liquidation. Table 2 summarizes the main theoretical predictions on 
these issues. 
Table 2 
EFFECTS OF DEBT STRUCTURE 
ON THE PROBABILITIES OF LIQUIDATION AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
VARIABLES  PROBABILITY OF LIQUIDATION     
UNDER FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
PROBABILITY OF  
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
     
SHORT TERM CREDIT 
INCREASE 
(LIQUIDITY RISK ↑) 
DIAMOND (1991; 2004) 
INCREASE 
 (LIQUIDITY RISK ↑) 
DIAMOND (1991; 2004) 
COLLATERALIZATION  
INCREASE 
 (COORDINATION FAILURE ↑) 
BOLTON AND SCHARFSTEIN (1996) 
INCREASE (MONITORING ↓) 
MANOVE ET AL. (2001)  
REDUCTION (MONITORING ↑) 
RAJAN AND WINTON (1995) 
TRADE CREDIT  
VS. SHORT TERM BANK LOANS 
REDUCTION 
(CREDITOR INACTIVITY ↑)  
BRIS AND WELCH (2005) 
INCREASE (MONITORING ↓) 
DIAMOND (1984) 
REDUCTION (MONITORING ↑) 
PETERSEN AND RAJAN (1997) 
BONDS  
VS. LONG TERM BANK LOANS 
REDUCTION 
(CREDITOR INACTIVITY ↑)  
BRIS AND WELCH (2005) 
INCREASE (MONITORING ↓) 
DIAMOND (1984) 
REDUCTION (MONITORING ↑) 
KHALIL ET AL. (2007) 
 
Debt maturity is the first factor to be considered. Diamond (2004) shows that, like the 
presence  of  dispersed  creditors,  short term  credit  can  be  used  to  discipline  managerial 
behaviour,  especially  in  legal  systems  with  ineffective  or  costly  contract  enforcement.
11 
Encouraging “firm runs”, short term debt can increase the probability of liquidation of firms 
in financial distress. On the other hand, it can also expose borrowers to the risk of financial 
distress due to an unexpected contraction of credit. From this point of view, higher shares of 
                                                           
10   See for example Diamond (1993), Berglöf and von Thadden (1994), Hart and Moore (1995). 
11   In case of bad news about the debtor, short term debt can be subject to “firm runs” that can serve to 
   10 
short term  debt  should  increase  the  probabilities  of  financial  distress  and  liquidation. 
However, when we examine the effects of different debt structures, we should also consider 
other characteristics, like the presence of collateral and the dispersion of debt holders. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that coordination among creditors may be more 
difficult when some creditors have security interests, as conflicts may arise among different 
classes of lenders. Since it is more difficult to reconcile the conflicting claims of debt holders 
when the degree of collateralization is higher, this can increase the probability of liquidation. 
The presence of collateral can also have an effect on bank monitoring. Manove et al. (2001) 
posit  that  unrestricted  reliance  on  (outside)  collateral  can  weaken  banks’  incentive  to 
carefully evaluate the profitability of investment projects (thus increasing the probability of 
financial  distress),  while  Rajan  and  Winton  (1995)  argue  that  the  presence  of  (inside) 
collateral can represent an incentive to monitor. 
As regards the dispersion of debt holders, while Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show 
that  multiple  creditors  make  debt  renegotiation  more  difficult,  Bris  and  Welch  (2005) 
emphasize that dispersed creditors are at a disadvantage when they must act to enforce their 
claims (for instance, when active opposition to a management’s relief plan is required). This 
disadvantage is increased by legal and administrative costs that each creditor has to sustain 
in order to negotiate with the borrower. As a consequence, a firm with a large number of 
dispersed creditors can be in a stronger bargaining position than one with more concentrated 
creditors.  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)  and  Bris  and  Welch  (2005)  offer  opposite 
theoretical predictions, but their results seem to apply to different empirical situations. Bris 
and Welch (2005) emphasize that their model applies to situations – such as trade payables 
or bonds – where the dispersion of creditors is much greater than in the case of bank debt,
12 
while  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)  interpret  their  findings  as  describing  the  effects  of 
different  levels  of  concentration  in  bank  lending  or  in  public  debt.
13  Consequently,  our 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
commit multiple lenders to enforce their claims. 
12   “Our model posits that, given a fixed level of debt, a distressed firm with a million uncoordinated small 
creditors is less likely to be forced to pay its obligations than a firm with one creditor or a firm with creditors 
that have a coordinating organ” (authors’ italics). And they add: “The strongest application of our model 
applies to idiosyncratic, small credit such as small trade credit (…). To a lesser extent, our model could also 
apply to highly dispersed public debt that is not fully coordinated” (p. 2194). 
13   “Our results on the number of creditors could be interpreted as suggesting a trade off between bank debt 
   11 
hypothesis is that the predictions of Bris and Welch apply to the distinction between bank 
debt on the one hand and trade credit payable and bonds on the other, while those of Bolton 
and Scharfstein describe the effects of bank credit concentration. 
As  regards  trade  creditors’  monitoring  ability,  the  theoretical  literature  shows  that 
suppliers can have some comparative advantage in this field. Suppliers would benefit from 
relatively low screening and monitoring costs (Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 
1997) and would be less subject to moral hazard problems (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).
14 
As  for  bonds,  the  existence  of  a  set  of  rules  and  institutions  (such  as  disclosure  rules, 
auditing  firms,  rating  agencies)  could  represent  an  implicit  form  of  coordination  or 
centralization to perform monitoring. Thus, in both circumstances reduced monitoring ability 
due to the dispersion of creditors could be offset by these specific effects. 
2.2  Methodology 
In  order  to  identify  the  monitoring  effect  that  creditor  concentration  exerts  on  the 
probability of financial distress, we must control for the soft budget constraint effect, as a 
lower probability of liquidation can give rise to perverse incentives ex ante for borrowers, 
thereby  affecting  the  likelihood  of  financial  distress.  We  apply  the  following  empirical 
strategy. Using a probit model, equation (1) describes the determinants of the probability of 
the firm incurring financial distress at time (t + 1): 
(1)  ( ) 3 2 2 1 1 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 Pr( a a t t t   t  z d + + + F = = + α x α x , 
where  1 ) 1 ( = +  t  d  if firm i is in financial distress at time (t + 1), 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
and public debt since firms often have many public debt holders but few banks. (…) However, it would be 
misleading to put too much weight on this interpretation. Bank debt can be syndicated to many banks and some 
public debt instruments are held by only a few investors. Thus we would prefer to interpret the results as 
suggesting when bank debt is syndicated and when public debt is widely held.” (pp. 3 4). 
14  Suppliers’  comparative  advantage  in  information  acquisition  might  come  from  direct  dealings  with 
customers, deep knowledge of the buyers’ industrial sector, frequent visits for commercial purposes and the 
opportunity to compare customers’ behaviour with the behaviour of other agents in the same industry. Burkart 
and Ellingsen (2004), moreover, underline that trade credit is linked to the purchase of inputs, which are 
illiquid and so are likely to be less easily diverted than cash.   12 
Variable zt in equation (1) represents the probability of liquidation in the event of 
financial distress. Since it is unobservable, we estimate zt by equation (2): 
(2)  ( ) 3 3 1 1 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 | 1 Pr( β x β x t t t   t  d l + + F = = = + b , 
where  1 ) 1 ( = +  t  l  if firm i is liquidated at time (t + 1), 0 otherwise;  1 = t d  if firm i is in 
financial  distress  at  time t,  0  otherwise.
15  We  use  a bivariate probit  model  with  sample 
selection to estimate equation (2). Hence the probability of liquidation is estimated jointly 
with the selection equation for firms that are in financial distress at time t: 
(3)  ( ) 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 ) 1 Pr( δ x δ x δ x t t t t d + + + F = = d . 
All variables used to estimate equation (2) are also used for equation (3), as the probability 
that  the  firm  is  liquidated,  in  case  of  financial  distress,  should  in  turn  influence  the 
probability of the firm running into financial distress. 
Vector  t 3 x  in equation (2) is needed in order to achieve identification of equation (1), 
while vector  t 2 x  in equation (3) is needed in order to achieve identification of equation (2). 
Vector  t 3 x must  contain  variables  that  only  influence  the  probability  of  liquidation  of 
financially distressed firms, while vector  t 2 x  refers to the variables that only have an impact 
on the probability of the firm entering financial distress. 
2.3  Data description 
Our analysis is based on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms observed from 1997 
to 2003. We use a large database with information drawn from different sources. Variable 
sources and definition are described in detail in the statistical appendix. Our final sample has 
42,533  observations  for  13,597  firms.  Most  of  the  firms  in  the  sample  are  small  and 
medium size companies: the median firm has 57 employees; values for the first and third 
                                                           
15  Standard errors obtained by the probit regression of equation (1) should be adjusted to take into account 
that zt is an estimated regressor. Although zt is a control variable in our model (and we are not interested in 
testing its statistical significance) and the effect on the standard errors of the remaining variables is negligible, 
we will address this issue by means of a block bootstrap procedure.   13 
quartiles are, respectively, 33 and 106. Firms with at least 250 employees represent only 8.0 
per cent of the sample, those with at least 500 employees are just 3.0 per cent. 
A firm is defined as in liquidation if it enters one of the bankruptcy procedures or a 
procedure of forced liquidation within two years (voluntary liquidation is excluded). Overall, 
the number of observations for firms that were liquidated between 1998 and 2003 is 502, 
equal to 1.2 per cent of the total number of observations. A firm is defined as financially 
distressed  if  its  interest  coverage  ratio  (the  ratio  of  earnings  before  interests,  taxes  and 
depreciation to interest charges) is lower than one.
16 On this definition, the observations of 
financially  distressed  firms  number  2,639,  or  6.2  per  cent  of  the  sample.  The  share  of 
financially distressed firms that run into liquidation within two years is equal to 9.1 per cent. 
The explanatory variables used to test the theoretical predictions summarized in Tables 
1  and  2  are:  the  Herfindahl Hirschman  index  computed  both  on  credit  granted 
(HHI_GRANTED) and on credit used (HHI_USED); the ratios of debt composition (ST_DEBT, 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT, BONDS/LT_DEBT, OTHER_DEBT); a dummy variable for the presence of 
bonds
17 (DUMMY_BONDS); and the degree of collateralization (COLLATERAL).
 18 
Table A1 shows that in our sample the main source of financing is short term debt and 
that nearly two thirds of short term debt is in the form of trade debt. The share of bonds in 
long term  debt,  on  the  contrary,  is  very  low,  averaging  5.2  per  cent  (the  number  of 
observations for firms with bonds is equal to only 14.6 per cent of the sample). With regard 
to  bank firm  relationships,  the  descriptive  analysis  shows  that  multiple  but  asymmetric 
lending prevails: the average number of relationships is 9, but if we take into account the 
                                                           
16  In the empirical literature several different proxies are used for financial distress. Hoshi et al. (1990), 
Asquith et al. (1994) and Hall and Weinstein (2000) use an interest coverage ratio of less than one to classify 
firms as in financial distress. Other studies use ratings assigned by specialized rating agencies (Betker et al., 
1993) or internal ratings assigned by lending banks (Brunner and Krahnen, 2004; Elsas and Krahnen, 2002). 
Firms are also classified as in financial distress when the price of shares records a deep fall (Gilson, 1989; 
1990) or when the borrower is placed in the bank’s specialised head office unit for distressed companies 
(Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
17  We include this dummy variable to check if it is the share or the simple presence of bonds to affect the 
outcomes. This is especially relevant for the probability of financial distress, since disclosure rules and other 
factors affecting monitoring are not tied to the share of bonds over total debt. 
18  While we have information on the share of bank loans backed by collateral, we do not have similar 
information for other forms of debt. Since trade credit and bonds are usually unsecured, we measure the degree 
of collateralization as the ratio of collateralized bank loans to total debt.   14 
degree of concentration the number equivalent decreases to 4.7 for credit granted and to 3.2 
for credit used.
19 Finally, the share of collateralized bank loans in total debt averages 10.3 
per cent. 
Variables  influencing  only  the  probability  of  liquidation  include  a  dummy  for  full 
liability  firms  (FULL_LIABILITY)  and  the  ratio  of  total  assets  to  the  number  of  employees 
(LOG_ASSETS_EMPL).  Ceteris  paribus,  the  probability  of  liquidation  should  be  higher  for 
limited liability companies (since in this case the entrepreneurs’ liability is limited to their 
capital contributions) and lower when the company’s obligations are met with both corporate 
assets  and  members’  assets.
20  Since  employees  are  preferred  creditors  under  Italian 
bankruptcy law, a low level of assets per employee signals that a smaller fraction of total 
assets will be available to satisfy the claims of other creditors, triggering the liquidation of 
distressed firms.
21 
Variables that should only influence the probability of financial distress, through their 
effect  on  lenders’  monitoring  ability,  include:  the  log  of  firm’s  age  (LOG_AGE)  and  its 
squared value (LOG_AGE_SQ);
22 the share of tangible assets over total assets (TANGIBLES);
23 
the ratio of bank loans secured by accounts receivable to total debt (AR_SECURED_LOANS) and 
the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets (RECEIVABLES);
24 the geographical proximity 
between banks and firms (BANK_PROXIMITY).
25 Except for  LOG_AGE_SQ, all the remaining 
variables should reduce the probability of financial distress. 
                                                           
19  The Herfindahl Hirschman index is, in fact, equal to 0.213 when computed on credit granted and equal 
to 0.310 when computed on credit used. 
20  In our sample full liability firms consist in companies limited by shares with one shareholder and by 
private limited liability companies with one member, since Italian law generally provides that for these firms, 
in case of default, the single shareholder or member has unlimited liability for the company’s obligations. For 
more details, see Campobasso (2002). 
21  When we separately introduce in the regression the log of total assets and the log of the number of 
employees, the two variables have exactly the same coefficients but with opposite signs. 
22  Informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers should be lower when the borrowing firm is 
older and with a longer track record. 
23  We use the share of tangible assets on total assets as a proxy for the transparency of the firm’s balance 
sheet structure (Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). 
24   These  two  variables  measure  the  bank’s  monitoring  ability  arising  from  the  observation  of  the 
borrower’s transactions and from the access to a continuous flow of information on the borrower’s commercial 
and financial relationships (Mester et al., 2007; Nakamura, 1993). 
25   Proximity between the borrowing firm and the lending bank should enhance the bank’s ability to collect 
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To control for the possibility that debt structure variables might simply reflect firm 
risk, we also include in the model the variable used to classify firms as financially distressed 
(COVERAGE)  and  a  dummy  variable  for  observations  where  the  bank  debt  owed  by  the 
borrower exceeds the amount granted by the bank (OVERDRAWN_CREDIT). Finally, we include 
a set of dummy variables to control for other sources of heterogeneity among firms: size, 
industry, geographical location and affiliation with a corporate group. 
3.  Empirical results 
In this section we set out the results for our baseline specification, leaving possible 
extensions to the next section, where we present a large set of robustness checks. 
3.1 Liquidation 
The first column in Table A2 reports the results for the probability of liquidation of 
financially distressed firms. Consistently with the prediction of the literature on relationship 
banking, higher concentration of bank credit used reduces the probability of liquidation of 
financially  distressed  firms.  However,  in  accordance  with  the  assumption  that  multiple 
lending helps a financially distressed firm to increase its credit or to substitute lenders who 
are willing to withdraw, high concentration of bank credit granted is associated with higher 
probability of liquidation for distressed firms. 
As  for  the  other  factors,  we  find  that  higher  proportions  of  long term  debt  are 
associated with lower probabilities of liquidation, consistently with theoretical predictions 
that longer maturities reduce liquidity risks for borrowers (Diamond 1991; 2004).
26 If we 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
and use soft information to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers, especially for small firms (Berger et al., 
2001; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Carling and Lundberg, 2005). Our proximity index is equal to 1 if the bank 
and the firm are located in the same province, 0.5 if they are located in the same region, and 0 otherwise. On 
the assumption that geographical proximity is not relevant for large banks and large firms, the index is equal to 
0 if the bank is classified as a national bank or the firm has at least 250 employees. The index is then weighted 
by each bank’s share of the firm’s total bank debt. 
26 The share of long term bank loans in total debt could be considered as potentially endogenous. A higher 
share may simply reflect the decision already taken by the banks to renegotiate debt maturity in order to help 
the firm to recover from financial distress. To address this issue we re estimated our model on the sub sample 
of firms that are for the first time in financial distress at time t. The results (not reported) show no significant 
difference.   16 
contrast financing sources with similar maturities, we find that a higher share of trade credit 
(compared  with  short term  bank  loans)  is  associated  with  a  lower  probability  of 
liquidation,
27 while we do not find any significant difference between bonds and long term 
bank  loans.  However,  the  presence  of  bonds  reduces  the  probability  of  liquidation  of 
distressed firms. Our results are consistent with the prediction set forth by Bris and Welch 
(2005) that a financially distressed firm with a large number of small creditors lacking a 
coordinating organ has a lower probability of being liquidated than a firm  with a small 
number of creditors. 
Finally, our results show that a higher share of debt secured by collateral increases the 
probability of liquidation of distressed firms, as predicted by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). 
3.2  Financial distress 
Having  estimated  the  probability  that  a  financially  distressed  firm  will  run  into 
liquidation,  we  can  obtain  its  predicted  value  (PROB_LIQUIDATION)
  28  and  use  it  in  the 
regression of the probability that borrowers will be in financial distress in the following two 
years.
 29 As noted earlier, by including the predicted value in the model we control for the 
soft budget constraint effect and disentangle it from the monitoring effect. 
3.2.1  The impact of closer bank relationships 
The specification of column [2] in Table A2 controls for the soft budget constraint 
effect (PROB_LIQUIDATION). The marginal effect is negative and quite strong ( 15.6 per cent), 
supporting the theoretical prediction that a high probability of liquidation under financial 
distress represents a strong incentive for firms to avoid risky and opportunistic behaviour. 
The  results  concerning  creditor  concentration  are  consistent  with  theoretical 
predictions. When the lines of credit are concentrated in a few banks, the probability of 
                                                           
27  Wilner (2000) and Cuñat (2007) show that trade creditors, desiring to maintain an enduring product 
market relationship, may make more concessions to a customer in financial distress than would banks, which 
are less dependent on any of their customers. 
28  To obtain the predicted value for firms that are not currently in financial distress we impute the average 
value of COVERAGE that we observe in the sample of financially distressed firms.   17 
financial  distress  is  higher,  due  to  higher  liquidity  risks.  On  the  other  hand,  high 
concentration of bank credit drawn lowers the probability of financial distress by enhancing 
monitoring ability. However, the liquidity effect turns out to be stronger than the monitoring 
effect, as is evident by comparing the two marginal effects (0.134 as against  0.041). The 
same result is obtained by removing one of the two variables from the regression: in each 
case the impact of the remaining variable is positive and statistically significant. 
Column  [3]  in  Table  A2  reports  the  results  when  we  do  not  control  for  the 
soft budget constraint  effect.  The  aim  of  this  exercise  is  twofold:  i)  to  assess  the  bias 
introduced  in  estimating  the  monitoring  effect  when  the  soft budget constraint  effect  is 
neglected, and ii) to estimate the impact that is jointly determined through both channels. 
Compared with the previous specification, the coefficient of the concentration of bank credit 
used (HHI_USED) is no longer significant. This shows that the effect of enhanced monitoring 
is offset by the soft budget constraint effect. By contrast, the liquidity effect is still positive 
and  significant.  We  conclude  that  the  overall  effect  of  bank  credit  concentration  is  an 
increase in the probability of financial distress. Moreover, close banking relationships lower 
the probability of liquidation by reducing the chances of bankruptcy for distressed firms and 
not by helping to prevent states of financial distress. 
3.2.2  The impact of other variables 
Higher shares of short term debt are associated with higher probabilities of financial 
distress, consistently with theoretical predictions that shorter maturities increase liquidity 
risks for borrowers (Diamond 1991; 2004). On the other hand, higher shares of short term 
debt held by trade creditors are associated with lower probabilities of financial distress. This 
result provides some empirical support for the hypothesis that trade creditors have some 
specific  monitoring  advantages  over  banks,  which  outweigh  the  disadvantages  of  higher 
dispersion. As for financing sources with longer maturity, the explanatory variables related 
to  bonds  aim  at  disentangling  the  effect  of  creditor  dispersion  from  the  effect  of  firm 
transparency. The results show that the presence of bonds (DUMMY_BONDS) is associated with 
a  lower  probability  of  financial  distress,  while  the  share  of  bonds  in  long term  debt 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
29   At this stage we exclude from the analysis the firms that will be liquidated in the following two years.   18 
(BONDS/LT_DEBT) is not statistically significant. Our findings lend support to the hypothesis 
that the existence of a set of rules and institutions (such as disclosure rules, auditing firms, 
rating agencies) could represent an implicit form of coordination or centralization to perform 
monitoring, and this channel seems to outweigh the disadvantages arising from the higher 
dispersion of creditors. 
The  ratio  of  bank  loans  secured  by  collateral  to  total  debt  only  has  a  marginally 
significant negative effect on the probability of financial distress. Our empirical evidence 
rejects the hypothesis that a high level of collateral weakens the bank’s incentive to perform 
screening and monitoring, but neither does it strongly support the alternative that collateral 
increases the bank’s monitoring ability. 
Finally, we find evidence that all the variables included to measure different factors 
that can affect lenders’ ability to monitor are highly significant and with the expected sign. 
4.  Robustness checks and extensions 
In this section we present a large series of robustness checks for the results reported 
above: i) we check our identification strategies; ii) we use a block bootstrap procedure to 
take into account that in the equation for financial distress the probability of liquidation is a 
generated regressor; iii) we check the robustness of our results to the possible endogeneity of 
the concentration of bank relations; iv) we use different explanatory variables to measure the 
double effect of the concentration of bank credit; v) we test whether higher concentration of 
bank credit really affects the probability of financial distress by enhancing banks’ monitoring 
ability. This also gives us the opportunity to present some extensions of our previous results. 
Since the Wald test reported in Table A2 shows that equation for the probability of 
liquidation and the selection equation for the probability of being in financial distress are 
independent, in the rest of the paper we use a simple probit model to estimate the probability   19 
of liquidation under financial distress.
30 The results, reported in Table A3, confirm those in 
Table A2.
31 
4.1 Checking the identification strategies 
First, we test that the group of variables that we suppose have an influence only on the 
probability  of  financial  distress  should  not  also  be  included  in  the  equation  for  the 
probability of liquidation. This is required for the identification of the model with sample 
selection. As can be seen in Table A4, these variables are not statistically significant either 
individually or as a group. 
Second, we check the identification of the equation for financial distress. In this case 
we  rely  on  two  variables  (the  dummy  for  full  liability  firms  and  the  log  of  assets  per 
employee), which are only included in the equation for the probability of liquidation. A 
possible objection is that these two variables should also be included in the equation for 
financial  distress.  As  regards  the  log  of  assets  per  employee,  in  order  to  check  our 
identification strategy we re estimate the regression for the probability of financial distress 
including LOG_ASSETS_EMPL among the explanatory variables. The coefficient of the variable 
is  not  statistically  significant,  confirming  our  hypothesis  that  the  level  of  assets  per 
employees does not have a direct effect on the probability of financial distress.  
As for the FULL_LIABILITY variable, one could argue that unlimited liability may lower 
the level of risk entrepreneurs are willing to bear, thus reducing the probability of financial 
distress. We posit, on the contrary, that the entrepreneur who is willing to undertake riskier 
projects has a stronger incentive to choose full liability in order to reduce the probability of 
liquidation  in  case  of  financial  distress.  Under  this  hypothesis,  full  liability  should  be 
associated with a higher probability of financial distress (instead of a lower probability)
32 
and should be considered as endogenous in the equation for financial distress. Since we 
                                                           
30  This is computationally less burdensome especially for the bootstrap procedure. 
31  To  check  the  robustness  of  our  results  we  also  estimated  the  probability  of  liquidation  by  using  a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. The results (not reported) are similar to the ones in Tables A2 and 
A3. 
32 In our model this effect works through the probability of liquidation: full liability lowers the probability 
of liquidation, which in turn increases the probability of distress.   20 
cannot  formally  test  these  conflicting  hypotheses,  we  rely  on  some  simple  empirical 
evidence, which supports our hypothesis. As a matter of fact, in our sample the probability of 
financial distress is higher for full liability firms (19.5 per cent) than for other borrowers 
(12.2 per cent) and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
4.2  Block bootstrap estimation 
To take into account that the probability of liquidation is a generated regressor in the 
equation for financial distress, we perform a block bootstrap estimation at the firm level. 
From the whole sample we draw 1,000 bootstrap samples drawing blocks of data from the 
units of observation. In any sample we replicate the two stage estimation procedure: we 
estimate the probability of liquidation, obtain the predicted value and use it in the estimation 
for the probability of financial distress. The results presented in Table A5 show that the 
significance level of the observed coefficients does not change when we correct the standard 
errors, using either normal, percentile or bias corrected confidence intervals. Moreover, for 
all but two explanatory variables the estimated bias is lower than 25 per cent of the standard 
error and therefore it should not represent a problem (Efron, 1982). The two exceptions are 
the variables PROB_LIQUIDATION and OVERDRAWN_CREDIT. In both cases, however, the sign of 
the  bias  is  opposite  to  that  of  the  observed  coefficient,  implying  that  the  bias corrected 
coefficient is larger in absolute value than the observed coefficient.
33 
4.3  Endogeneity of the concentration of bank relations 
Firms with higher probability of financial distress may choose to keep fewer banking 
relations in order to enhance their chances of debt renegotiation in the event of distress. If 
this is true, creditor concentration should be considered as endogenous in the equation for 
financial distress. In this section we address this potential reverse causality issue by using a 
                                                           
33 We also performed a two stage block bootstrap estimation as follows. In the first stage we performed 100 
replications of the estimation of the equation for the probability of liquidation and obtained the predicted 
probability of liquidation for all firms. In the second stage, for any set of predicted values from the first stage 
regression we performed 100 replications of the estimates concerning the probability of financial distress. We 
thus obtained 10,000 replications of the second stage regression. The results (not reported) are similar to those 
in Table A5.   21 
two stage  instrumental variable  procedure  with  the  following  instruments:  (1)  the 
Herfindahl Hirschman index of total bank credit concentration (lagged by one year) in the 
province  where  the  firm  is  located;
34  (2)  the  effect  of  bank  mergers  on  bank  credit 
concentration for individual firms;
35 (3) the degree of co movement between the sales of the 
firm and the sales of other firms in the same industry.
36 Table A6 reports the results of the 
two stage procedure for both the least squares and the probit models. These results confirm 
our  previous  findings  that  higher  concentration  of  credit  lines  raises  the  probability  of 
financial distress, by increasing liquidity risks for borrowers, while higher concentration of 
bank  credit  actually  used  reduces  the  likelihood  of  distress  after  controlling  for  the 
soft budget constraint effect. Table A7 focuses on the results of the 2SLS estimation. As 
regards the first stage equation for both the endogenous variables, it shows that HHI_PROV, 
BANK_MERGERS  and  COMOVEMENT  are  significant  determinants  of  firms’  creditor 
concentration and have the expected signs. The Cragg Donald F statistic exceeds the critical 
value of 8.18, implying a bias relative to OLS of less than 0.15 (Stock and Yogo, 2005) and 
indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The Sargan statistic 
fails to reject the overidentifying restrictions, suggesting that the use of all three variables as 
instruments is appropriate. 
                                                           
34   The variable measures the degree of concentration by including the loans granted to manufacturing 
firms excluded from our sample and to sectors other than manufacturing (households and government, for 
example). 
35   If in year t a merger takes place between bank A and bank B, we re compute the Herfindahl Hirschman 
index for year t 1 by considering the two banks as one. We use the difference between this value and the actual 
one  as  our  measure of  the merger’s  effect  on  bank  credit  concentration;  this  measure  is  then used  as  an 
instrumental variable for the Herfindahl Hirschman index in year t. For a different use of bank mergers as an 
instrument for bank credit concentration, see Garriga (2006). 
36   If the co movement is high, banks will be less interested in knowing the economic performance of 
individual firms; furthermore, the redeployability of firms’ assets is likely to be low, since the best potential 
buyers  are  the  firms  in  the  same  industry  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1992;  Guiso  and  Minetti,  2004).  As  a 
consequence, the advantage of having a close relationship with the firm is less valuable for the bank. To 
compute the co movement of sales, we use the same method as in Guiso and Minetti (2004). We use data from 
Company Accounts Database over the period 1997 2003 for a total of 139,537 firm year observations. We 
group  firms  into  23  industries  using  a  two digit  classification  and  then,  for  each  industry,  regress  the 
standardized annual rate of growth of firms’ sales on a full set of year dummies. If firms within an industry co 
move significantly, the year dummies will explain a large part of sales variability. We thus retain the R
2 of 
these regressions and use it as a measure of co movement of firms in the industry.   22 
4.4  The double effect of the concentration of bank credit 
The  opposite  effects  of  our  two  measures  of  bank  credit  concentration  could  be 
suspected to be the artificial outcome of introducing two highly correlated variables in a 
nonlinear regression.
37 We check the robustness of our results by separating factors which 
are common to the two variables from factors which characterize each single variable. We 
follow  two  different  approaches.  First,  since  in  general  only  for  credit  lines  is  there  a 
difference between the amount of credit granted and the amount of credit actually disbursed, 
only for credit lines do we use two different indexes of concentration.
38 Second, since the 
Herfindahl Hirschman index (H) summarizes information on the number of banks (N) and 
on the distribution of banks’ shares, we include among the explanatory variables the (log of 
the) number of banking relationships (which is an element common to both of the indexes of 
concentration) and a measure of the variance of banks’ shares, computed both for credit 
granted and for credit used.
  39 Controlling for the number  of banks, a greater degree of 
asymmetry between banks’ shares will result in higher concentration. 
Table A8 reports the results for the first experiment. Concentration of credit granted 
under  lines  of  credit  increases  both  the  probability  of  liquidation  and  that  of  financial 
distress.  This  result  confirms  the  existence  of  liquidity  risks  associated  with  more 
concentrated  banking  relationships  (Detragiache  et  al.,  2000).  Concentration  of  credit 
disbursed  under  lines  of  credit  reduces  both  the  probability  of  liquidation  and  that  of 
financial  distress.  By  contrast,  while  the  concentration  of  fixed term  loans  reduces  the 
likelihood of liquidation, it has no effect on the probability of financial distress. As we 
already noted in the baseline regression, this result lends support to the hypothesis that the 
monitoring  effect  of  closer  banking  relationships  essentially  works  through  the  flows  of 
information  on  borrowers  that  banks  are  able  to  obtain  by  observing  transactions  on 
                                                           
37   In our sample the correlation between the two variables is 0.72. As a direct check, we also fit a linear 
probability model, since both variables should tend to be non significant, if there is a multicollinearity problem. 
The results (not reported) show no significant difference with respect to the probit models. 
38   In this case the correlation between the two variables falls to 0.63. 
39   We  measure  the  variance  of  banks’  shares  as:  ( ) ( )
* log log N N - ,  where H N 1
* = is  the 
numbers equivalent which translates the  measure of concentration into the number of equally sized banks 
constituting the same level of concentration (Adelman, 1969). The correlation between the indexes computed 
on credit granted and on credit used is 0.55.   23 
customers’ accounts (Mester et al., 2007; Nakamura, 1993). However, there is no evidence 
that  creditor  concentration  enhances  monitoring  by  reducing  free  riding  in  monitoring 
efforts. 
Table A9 reports the results for the second experiment. A high number of banking 
relationships increases the probability of liquidation but lowers the probability of financial 
distress. The variance of banks’ shares lowers both probabilities when it is measured on 
credit disbursed, while it increases both probabilities when it is measured on credit granted. 
Furthermore, the results confirm that the effect of multiple lending relations in reducing 
liquidity risks outweighs the effect due to a lower monitoring ability. 
4.5  Does relationship banking really enhance monitoring? 
Finally, we want to test whether higher concentration of bank credit really affects the 
probability of financial distress by enhancing the ability of banks to monitor borrowers. First 
of all, since the literature suggests that relationship banking should be more valuable for 
younger,  smaller  and  less  transparent  firms,  we  select  those  firms  which  are  below  the 
median in terms of age, size and ratio of tangibles to total assets and we test the hypothesis 
that the effect of HHI_USED is stronger in this sub sample of firms. Second, since the ability 
of  the  “main  banks”  to  monitor  borrowers  should  be  enhanced  when  borrowers  pledge 
accounts receivable as collateral,
40 we test the hypothesis that AR_SECURED_LOANS (the share 
of  loans  secured  by  accounts  receivable  in  total  debt)  and  HHI_USED  have  a  mutually 
reinforcing  effect.  Both  hypotheses  are  confirmed  by  the  results  reported  in  Table  A10. 
Column [1] shows that for younger, smaller and less transparent firms the marginal effect of 
HHI_USED is significantly stronger in reducing the probability of financial distress than for 
other borrowers: while the effect for younger, smaller and less transparent firms ( 7.3 per 
cent) is significant at the 1 per cent level, the effect for other borrowers ( 3.5 per cent) is 
significant only at the 10 per cent level. Similarly, column [2] shows the reinforcing effect of 
the share of accounts receivable secured loans in total debt and the concentration of credit 
used. This result confirms our previous finding that the monitoring effect of closer banking 
                                                           
40   Monitoring cash flows arising from the collection of accounts receivable on behalf of the borrower may 
provide more valuable information when most of the transactions are consolidated at one lender (Nakamura, 
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relationships essentially works through the flows of information on borrowers that banks are 
able to obtain by observing transactions on customers’ accounts. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have empirically investigated the influence that the concentration of 
bank relationships has on the probability of the borrower entering into financial distress and 
on the likelihood of liquidation in this event. 
Our results give new and more direct support to the predictions of the literature on 
relationship  banking.  First  of  all,  our  evidence  confirms  that  higher  concentration  of 
disbursed bank credit reduces the probability that a financially distressed firm will be forced 
into liquidation. Secondly, we show that, controlling for the soft budget constraint and the 
liquidity effects, higher concentration of bank credit also reduces the probability of financial 
distress, by fostering lenders’ ability to monitor borrowers. In accordance with theoretical 
predictions, we find that this effect is stronger for younger, smaller and less transparent 
firms.  Moreover,  our  results  suggest  that  the  monitoring  effect  of  closer  banking 
relationships essentially works through the flows of information on borrowers that banks are 
able to obtain by observing transactions on customers’ accounts (especially in the case of 
credit  lines  secured  by  accounts  receivable),  while  there  is  no  evidence  that  creditor 
concentration enhances monitoring by lowering free riding in monitoring efforts.  
We also show, however, that the benefits of relationship banking do not come without 
costs. On the one hand, the soft budget constraint effect offsets the lower probability of 
financial  distress  stemming  from  the  enhanced  monitoring  ability.  On  the  other,  higher 
concentration  of  credit  lines,  by  increasing  liquidity  risks  for  borrowers,  makes  both 
financial  distress  and  liquidation  more  likely.  As  for  financial  distress,  moreover,  the 
liquidity effect is quantitatively stronger than the monitoring effect. Ultimately, we find that 
the overall effect of more concentrated banking relations is a lower probability of liquidation 
for firms under financial distress, accompanied by a higher probability of incurring financial 
distress. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
1993).   25 
Finally, we also document and discuss the impact of other features of debt structure. 
The most interesting result is that, contrary to the prevailing view, the presence of debt held 
by  highly  dispersed  creditors  (such  as  trade  creditors  and  bondholders)  is  negatively 
associated  with  both  financial  distress  and  liquidation.  In  general,  this  suggests  that  the 
difference between concentrated creditors (such as banks) and dispersed creditors (such as 
trade  creditors  and  bondholders)  lies  not  in  more  effective  monitoring  by  banks,  but  in 





                                                           
41  Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Franks and Sussman (2005) for the 
UK: “while the banks’ typical response to distress is an attempt to rescue the firm (rather than liquidate it 
automatically), they are very tough in their bargaining with the distressed firm. We find only one case of debt 
forgiveness in our sample. Additionally, the banks very rarely expand lending during distress; on the contrary, 
the typical response is a significant contraction of lending. (…) We find no evidence of asset grabbing or 
creditors’ runs by dispersed trade creditors; rather, it is almost always the bank that takes the decision to place 
the company in bankruptcy” (p. 67).   26 
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Statistical appendix 
Sources 
The Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci) gathers yearly data on the 
balance sheets and income statements of a sample of about 40,000 Italian non financial and 
non agricultural firms. This information is collected and standardized by a consortium of 
banks. A firm enters the sample only if it borrows from at least one of the banks in the 
consortium. Cerved collects yearly data on balance sheets and income statements for all the 
Italian companies. 
We draw balance sheet and income statement data from the Company Accounts Data 
Service,  which  offers  more  disaggregated  balance sheet  items  than  Cerved,  while  firms’ 
personal data are taken from Cerved and include date of establishment, geographical location 
of the head office, legal form and the state of activity, with particular attention to the type of 
liquidation in the event of business termination. 
The Central Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi) records the exposures of banks for 
which the amount of credit granted or drawn or the guarantee provided exceeds the threshold 
of €75,000. From the Central Credit Register we draw, for each borrowing firm, data on the 
number of banking relations, credit granted, credit used, and the geographical location of the 
lenders. 
Banks’ balance sheet, income statement and personal data are drawn from the Banking 
Supervision Reports and the Bank Register at the Bank of Italy. 
Variable definition 
Dependent variables 
LIQUIDATION: binary variable equal to 1 if the firm runs into liquidation at time (t + 1) or 
(t + 2), equal to 0 otherwise. In this paper we refer to forced liquidation, as our aim is to 
investigate the outcome of situations of financial distress. In particular, firms are defined to 
be  in  liquidation  if  they  are  involved  in  one  of  the  bankruptcy  procedures  (straight 
bankruptcy,  preventive  composition,  controlled  administration,  administrative  liquidation, 
special administration of large enterprises) or in court ordered liquidation;  
DISTRESS: binary variable equal to 1 if at time (t + 1) or (t + 2) the firm has an interest 
coverage ratio lower than one, equal to 0 otherwise. 
Firm variables 
FULL_LIABILITY: binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is a company limited by shares with a 
sole shareholder or a private limited company with one member; 
LOG_AGE: logarithm of (1 + firm’s age); 
LOG_AGE_SQ: squared value of LOG_AGE; 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL: logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of employees;   32 
COVERAGE: ratio of earnings before interests, taxes and depreciation to interest expenses; 
TANGIBLES: ratio of gross tangible assets to gross total assets; 
RECEIVABLES: ratio of accounts receivable to gross total assets; 
ST_DEBT: ratio of short term debt to total debt; 
TRADE_DEBT/ST: ratio of trade debt to short term debt; 
LT_DEBT: ratio of medium and long term debt to total debt; 
BONDS/LT: ratio of bonds to medium and long term debt; 
DUMMY_BONDS: binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has bonds, equal to 0 otherwise; 
OTHER_DEBT: ratio of debt without specified maturity to total debt. 
Bank relationship variables 
NUMBER_OF_BANKS: number of banks (in log); 
HHI_GRANTED: Herfindahl Hirschman index, computed on bank credit granted; 
HHI_USED: Herfindahl Hirschman index, computed on bank credit used; 
COLLATERAL: ratio of collateralized loans to total debt; 
AR_SECURED_LOANS: ratio of loans secured by accounts receivable to total debt; 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT: binary variable equal to 1 when bank credit used exceeds bank credit 
granted, equal to 0 otherwise; 
BANK_PROXIMITY:  weighted  average  of  an  index  of  bank firm  proximity  that  takes  into 
account the firm’s size and the degree of the bank’s territorial spread. The proximity index, 
computed by bank, is equal to 1 if both the firm and the bank are located in the same 
province, 0.5 if they are located in the same region, 0 otherwise. The weights for the mean 
computation are represented by the ratio of each bank’s loans to bank credit used by the 
firm; 
PROB_LIQUIDATION:  predicted  value  of  the  probability  of  liquidation  (conditional  on 
financial distress).   33 
Tables 
Table A1 
SAMPLE STATISTICS  
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  1
st quartile  3
rd quartile 
Dependent variables 
LIQUIDATION  0.012  0.108  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DISTRESS  0.138  0.345  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Firm variables 
FULL_LIABILITY  0.082  0.275  0.000  0.000  0.000 
LOG_AGE  2.940  0.641  2.996  2.565  3.367 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL  5.283  0.671  5.223  4.830  5.673 
TANGIBLES  0.349  0.182  0.345  0.207  0.481 
RECEIVABLES  0.319  0.143  0.305  0.214  0.410 
COVERAGE  5.591  21.578  3.301  2.062  5.802 
ST_DEBT  0.660  0.174  0.678  0.545  0.793 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT  0.644  0.194  0.637  0.503  0.792 
LT_DEBT  0.224  0.157  0.197  0.101  0.319 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.052  0.155  0.000  0.000  0.000 
OTHER_DEBT  0.116  0.116  0.076  0.037  0.152 
DUMMY_BONDS  0.147  0.355  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Bank relationship variables 
NUMBER_OF_BANKS  2.068  0.518  2.079  1.792  2.398 
HHI_GRANTED  0.213  0.132  0.177  0.126  0.257 
HHI_USED  0.310  0.199  0.250  0.170  0.387 
COLLATERAL  0.103  0.120  0.066  0.000  0.167 
AR_SECURED_LOANS  0.190  0.131  0.182  0.082  0.283 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.031  0.174  0.000  0.000  0.000 
BANK_PROXIMITY  0.512  0.309  0.542  0.279  0.760 
           Table A2 
LIQUIDATION AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS  
(probit regressions) 
All  regressions  also  include  3  geographical  dummies,  7  industry  dummies,  5  dummies  for  firm  size  (number  of 
employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to a corporate group; the estimated coefficients or 
marginal effects are not shown. For dummy variables the marginal effect is computed for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at the 1 per cent 





(controlling for the             
soft budget constraint effect) 
Financial distress 
(without controlling for the    
soft budget constraint effect)  Variable 
Coefficients  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err. 
               
HHI_USED   2.431***  0.527   0.041**  0.021   0.019    0.020 
HHI_GRANTED  1.948***  0.597  0.134***  0.026  0.116  ***  0.026 
PROB_LIQUIDATION            0.156***  0.045             
COLLATERAL  0.864**  0.387   0.034*  0.019   0.046  **  0.019 
ST_DEBT  1.110***  0.353  0.122***  0.018  0.101  ***  0.017 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.709**  0.357   0.178***  0.019   0.167  ***  0.019 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.718  0.692  0.018  0.020  0.008    0.020 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.573**  0.287   0.033***  0.007   0.027  ***  0.007 
OTHER_DEBT  0.845*  0.491  0.142***  0.020  0.128  ***  0.020 
COVERAGE   0.062***  0.011   0.013***  0.002   0.013  ***  0.002 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.513***  0.155  0.092***  0.014  0.067  ***  0.011 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL   0.220**  0.086                         
FULL_LIABILITY   0.601***  0.180                         
LOG_AGE               0.056***  0.014   0.056  ***  0.014 
LOG_AGE_SQ              0.020***  0.005  0.020  ***  0.005 
TANGIBLES                0.119***  0.017   0.122  ***  0.017 
RECEIVABLES               0.139***  0.018   0.139  ***  0.018 
AR_SECURED_LOANS               0.192***  0.026   0.194  ***  0.026 
BANK_PROXIMITY               0.027***  0.007   0.027  ***  0.007 
                 
Pseudo R²    0.1130  0.1123 
Observations  42,533  42,031  42,031 
Wald test of indep. eqns.   Prob > c² = 0.9134     
       
(1)  Probit model with sample selection. The selection equation for financially distressed firms is not reported. 
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Table A3 
LIQUIDATION AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
(probit regressions) 
Both regressions also include 3 geographical dummies, 7 industry dummies, 5 dummies 
for firm size (number of employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to 
a corporate group; the estimated marginal effects are not shown. For dummy variables the 
marginal effect is computed for discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at the 1 per cent 
level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Variable  Liquidation 
Financial distress 
(controlling for the             
soft budget constraint effect) 
  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err. 
           
HHI_USED   0.258***  0.052   0.041  **  0.021 
HHI_GRANTED  0.209***  0.058  0.134  ***  0.026 
PROB_LIQUIDATION               0.156  ***  0.045 
COLLATERAL  0.090**  0.041   0.034  *  0.019 
ST_DEBT  0.116***  0.038  0.121  ***  0.018 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.078***  0.026   0.178  ***  0.019 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.075  0.073  0.018    0.020 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.042**  0.014   0.033  ***  0.007 
OTHER_DEBT  0.091**  0.045  0.142  ***  0.020 
COVERAGE   0.007***  0.001   0.013  ***  0.002 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.077***  0.021  0.092  ***  0.014 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL   0.023**  0.009             
FULL_LIABILITY   0.044***  0.009             
LOG_AGE               0.056  ***  0.014 
LOG_AGE_SQ              0.020  ***  0.005 
TANGIBLES               0.118  ***  0.017 
RECEIVABLES               0.138  ***  0.018 
AR_SECURED_LOANS               0.192  ***  0.026 
BANK_PROXIMITY               0.026  ***  0.007 
     
Pseudo R²  0.1751  0.1130 
Observations  2,639  42,031 
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Table A4 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 1: 
Checking the Identification Strategy 
(probit regression) 
The regression also includes a constant, 3 geographical dummies, 7 industry 
dummies, 5 dummies for firm size (number of employees), 4 year dummies, 
and  a  dummy  for  firms  belonging  to  a  corporate  group,  whose  estimated 
coefficients  are  not  shown.  ***  Significant  at  the  1  per  cent  level; 
** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Variable  Liquidation 
(probit) 
  Marginal effect  Std. Err. 
(1) 
     
HHI_USED   0.258 ***  0.052 
HHI_GRANTED  0.208 ***  0.058 
COLLATERAL  0.093 **  0.042 
ST_DEBT  0.115 ***  0.040 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.083 **  0.032 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.071   0.073 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.042 **  0.014 
OTHER_DEBT  0.089 **  0.045 
COVERAGE   0.007 ***  0.001 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.076 ***  0.021 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL   0.024 ***  0.009 
FULL_LIABILITY   0.045 ***  0.009 
LOG_AGE   0.014 
(2)  0.032 
LOG_AGE_SQ  0.005 
(2)  0.012 
TANGIBLES    0.002 
(2)  0.030 
RECEIVABLES  0.017 
(2)  0.039 
AR_SECURED_LOANS   0.012 
(2)  0.047 
BANK_PROXIMITY   0.010 
(2)  0.018 
       
Pseudo R²  0.1757 
Observations  2,639 
   
(1)  Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 
(2)    Test of joint significance: c² (6) = 1.00; Prob > c² = 0.9858 
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Table A5 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 2: 
Block Bootstrap Estimation 
(probit regressions) 
Regressions  also  include  a  constant,  3  geographical  dummies,  7  industry 
dummies, 5 dummies for firm size (number of employees), 4 year dummies, 
and  a  dummy  for  firms  belonging  to  a  corporate  group,  whose  estimated 
coefficients  are  not  shown.  *** Significant  at  the  1  per  cent  level; 
** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Variables  Financial distress 
(probit) 
  Observed 
Coefficient 
Bias  Bootstrap 
Std. Err. 
       
HHI_USED   0.249 **  0.020  0.119 
HHI_GRANTED  0.820   ***   0.014  0.146 
PROB_LIQUIDATION   0.953 ***  0.164  0.307 
COLLATERAL   0.206 *   0.014  0.121 
ST_DEBT  0.741 ***   0.022  0.115 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   1.083 ***  0.010  0.099 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.107    0.013  0.128 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.226 ***  0.009  0.057 
OTHER_DEBT  0.866 ***   0.018  0.123 
COVERAGE   0.081 ***   0.001  0.011 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.437 ***   0.018  0.057 
LOG_AGE   0.340 ***   0.000  0.087 
LOG_AGE_SQ  0.122 ***  0.000  0.032 
TANGIBLES    0.722 ***   0.003  0.091 
RECEIVABLES   0.841 ***   0.002  0.101 
AR_SECURED_LOANS   1.168 ***   0.002  0.148 
BANK_PROXIMITY   0.161 ***   0.001  0.044 
        
Observations  42,031 
Replications  10,000 
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Table A6 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 3: 
Controlling for the Endogeneity of the Concentration of Bank Credit 
(probit, 2SLS and ivprobit regressions) 
All  regressions  also  include  3  geographical  dummies,  7  industry  dummies,  5  dummies  for  firm  size  (number  of 
employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to a corporate group; the estimated marginal effects are 
not shown. For dummy variables the marginal effect is computed for discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant 
at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 







Coefficients  Std. Err.  Coefficients  Std. Err.  Coefficients  Std. Err. 
               
HHI_USED   0.249 **  0.123   1.363**  0.574   5.290  *  2.954 
HHI_GRANTED  0.820 ***  0.146  1.613***  0.622  6.488  **  3.144 
PROB_LIQUIDATION   0.953 ***  0.283   1.320**  0.615   6.261  **  3.171 
COLLATERAL   0.206 *  0.116  0.264**  0.134  0.906    0.695 
ST_DEBT  0.741 ***  0.114  0.279***  0.085  1.455  ***  0.438 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   1.083 ***  0.096   0.070  0.108   0.163    0.553 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.107   0.121  0.164**  0.077  0.722  *  0.402 
DUMMY_BONDS  0.226 ***  0.055   0.101***  0.038   0.526  ***  0.195 
OTHER_DEBT  0.866 ***  0.120  0.384***  0.110  1.743  **  0.568 
COVERAGE   0.081 ***  0.013   0.000  0.000   0.080  ***  0.003 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.437 ***  0.053  0.170***  0.038  0.638  ***  0.195 
LOG_AGE   0.340 ***  0.087   0.082***  0.017   0.326  ***  0.080 
LOG_AGE_SQ  0.122 ***  0.032  0.032***  0.006  0.130  ***  0.028 
TANGIBLES    0.722 ***  0.091   0.171***  0.025   0.542  ***  0.131 
RECEIVABLES   0.841 ***  0.103   0.205***  0.017   0.812  ***  0.084 
AR_SECURED_LOANS   1.168 ***  0.150   0.288***  0.037   1.138  ***  0.181 
BANK_PROXIMITY   0.161 ***  0.044   0.017  0.012   0.107  *  0.060 
                 
Pseudo R²  0.1130       
Wald chi2 (37)  1,242.84     2,737.77 
F (37, 41993)     53.91    
Wald test of exogeneity       
c² (2) = 3.67 
Prob > c² = 0.1594 
Observations  42,031  42,031  42,031 
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Table A7 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 3: 
Controlling for the Endogeneity of the Concentration of Bank Credit 
(probit and 2SLS regressions) 
Standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and  adjusted  for  clustering  on  firms. 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant 
at the 10 per cent level. 
 
probit results  2SLS results 
Variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
         
HHI_USED   0.249**  0.123   1.363**  0.574 
HHI_GRANTED  0.820***  0.146  1.613***  0.622 
Pseudo R²  0.1130   
Cragg Donald F statistic    10.109 
Chi2 (1) p value    0.9987 
Observations  42,031  42,031 
  First stage for HHI_USED 
HHI_PROV       0.193***  0.028 
BANK_MERGERS        0.456***  0.044 
COMOVEMENT         0.326***  0.038 
F STATISTICS    75.10 
  First stage for HHI_GRANTED 
HHI_PROV        0.242***  0.021 
BANK_MERGERS        0.424***  0.033 
COMOVEMENT         0.195***  0.029 
F STATISTICS    115.76 
     
F statistics is F test of excluded instruments. Chi2 (1) is the Sargan statistic testing the 
over identifying restriction.   40 
Table A8 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 4a: 
Separating Lines of Credit from Fixed Term Loans 
 
All regressions also include 3 geographical dummies, 7 industry dummies, 5 dummies for 
firm size (number of employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to a 
corporate group; the estimated coefficients or marginal effects are not shown. For dummy 
variables the marginal effect is computed for discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at 
the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Liquidation   Financial distress 
Variable 
Marginal 
effects  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err. 
         
HHI_FT_LOANS   0.055 ***  0.017  0.001  0.008 
HHI_L/C_USED   0.157 ***  0.038   0.030**  0.013 
HHI_L/C_GRANTED  0.164 ***  0.044  0.113***  0.018 
PROB_LIQUIDATION               0.144***  0.042 
COLLATERAL  0.095 **  0.041   0.030  0.019 
ST_DEBT  0.155 ***  0.040  0.113***  0.020 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.082 ***  0.025   0.173***  0.019 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.090   0.072  0.016  0.020 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.042 **  0.013   0.033***  0.007 
OTHER_DEBT   0.123 ***  0.047  0.135***  0.022 
COVERAGE   0.006 ***  0.001   0.013***  0.002 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT   0.084 ***  0.021  0.091***  0.014 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL   0.025 ***  0.008             
FULL_LIABILITY   0.042 ***  0.009             
LOG_AGE               0.056***  0.014 
LOG_AGE_SQ              0.020***  0.005 
TANGIBLES               0.120***  0.017 
RECEIVABLES               0.139***  0.018 
AR_SECURED_LOANS               0.187***  0.026 
BANK_PROXIMITY               0.025***  0.007 
     
Pseudo R²  0.1767  0.1133 
Observations  2,639  42,031 
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Table A9 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 4b: 
Number of Bank Relationships and Asymmetry 
 
All regressions also include 3 geographical dummies, 7 industry dummies, 5 dummies for 
firm size (number of employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to a 
corporate group; the estimated coefficients or marginal effects are not shown. For dummy 
variables the marginal effect is computed for discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at 
the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Liquidation   Financial distress 
Variable 
Marginal 
effects  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err. 
         
NUMBER_OF_BANKS  0.038 ***  0.010   0.016***  0.004 
VARIANCE_USED   0.082 ***  0.017   0.031***  0.008 
VARIANCE_GRANTED  0.114 ***  0.023  0.072***  0.012 
PROB_LIQUIDATION               0.150***  0.041 
COLLATERAL  0.047   0.041   0.046**  0.019 
ST_DEBT  0.108 ***  0.037  0.119***  0.018 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.064 **  0.026   0.166***  0.018 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.091   0.071  0.022  0.020 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.043 **  0.013   0.034***  0.007 
OTHER_DEBT  0.098 **  0.044  0.143***  0.021 
COVERAGE   0.006 ***  0.001   0.013***  0.002 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.070 ***  0.020  0.086***  0.013 
LOG_ASSETS_EMPL   0.033 ***  0.008             
FULL_LIABILITY   0.042 ***  0.009          
LOG_AGE               0.056***  0.014 
LOG_AGE_SQ              0.020***  0.005 
TANGIBLES               0.115***  0.016 
RECEIVABLES               0.134***  0.018 
AR_SECURED_LOANS               0.191***  0.026 
BANK_PROXIMITY               0.027***  0.007 
     
Pseudo R²  0.1893  0.1138 
Observations  2,639  42,031 
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 Table A10 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 5: 
Do Closer Banking Relationships Really Affect Monitoring? 
(probit regressions; marginal effects) 
Both regressions also include 3 geographical dummies, 7 industry dummies, 5 dummies for firm size 
(number of employees), 4 year dummies, and a dummy for firms belonging to a corporate group, 
whose  estimated  marginal  effects  are  not  shown.  For  dummy  variables  the  marginal  effect  is 
computed  for  discrete  change  from  0  to  1.  Standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and 
adjusted for clustering on firms. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent 
level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Variables  Financial distress  Financial distress 
  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err.  Marginal 
effects  Std. Err. 
           
HHI_USED   0.035*  0.021   0.059  ***  0.022 
HHI_USED*SUBSAMPLE   0.038**  0.015             
HHI_USED*AR_SECURED_LOANS               0.005      ***  0.002 
HHI_GRANTED  0.136***  0.026  0.146  ***  0.026 
PROB_LIQUIDATION   0.158***  0.045   0.174  ***  0.045 
COLLATERAL   0.034*  0.019   0.033  *  0.019 
ST_DEBT  0.122***  0.018  0.125  ***  0.018 
TRADE_DEBT/ST_DEBT   0.178***  0.019   0.182  ***  0.019 
BONDS/LT_DEBT  0.016  0.020  0.019    0.020 
DUMMY_BONDS   0.033***  0.007   0.034  ***  0.007 
OTHER_DEBT  0.141***  0.020  0.143  ***  0.020 
COVERAGE   0.013***  0.002   0.013  ***  0.002 
OVERDRAWN_CREDIT  0.093***  0.014  0.094  ***  0.014 
LOG_AGE   0.057***  0.014   0.056  ***  0.014 
LOG_AGE_SQ  0.020***  0.005  0.020  ***  0.005 
TANGIBLES   0.126***  0.017   0.117  ***  0.017 
RECEIVABLES   0.138***  0.018   0.137  ***  0.018 
AR_SECURED_LOANS   0.192***  0.026   0.203  ***  0.026 
BANK_PROXIMITY   0.027***  0.007   0.026  ***  0.007 
     
Pseudo R²  0.1133  0.1134 
Observations  42,031  42,031 
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